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Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal,
political, or economic contexts elicits truthful information and, in turn,
enables people to make informed decisions. Thus, we analyze experimen-
tally the conditions under which competition between experts induces the
experts to make truthful statements and enables jurors listening to these
statements to improve their decisions. Our results demonstrate that, con-
trary to game theoretic predictions and contrary to critics of our adversarial
legal system, competition induces enough truth telling to allow jurors to
improve their decisions. Then, when we impose additional institutions
(such as penalties for lying or the threat of verification) on the competing
experts, we observe even larger improvements in the experts' propensity to
tell the truth and in jurors' decisions. We find similar improvements when
the competing experts are permitted to exchange reasons for why their
statements may be correct.
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"LJ]urors sitting in a civil case frequently encounter not only one but several-
usually conflicting-presentations of expert testimony."
Kutnjak Ivkovic and Hans (2003:478)
"[The] central precept of [the] adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of
proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured ... setting is most likely to
come the information from which a neutral ... decision maker can resolve a
litigated dispute."
Landsman (1983:714)
In many legal, political, and economic contexts, people must make decisions
about which they are not fully informed. Because people typically lack the
opportunity and/or inclination to gather detailed information about these
decisions for themselves, they must often base their decisions on the state-
ments of others (Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia, 1992, 1994; Mondak, 1993;
Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Boudreau, 2006). For example, when deciding a
question at trial, jurors must rely on the statements of competing attorneys
and their witnesses. Or, when choosing among different candidates for
office, uninformed voters may rely on the statements of politicians compet-
ing in a debate and on the endorsements of trusted allies. Similarly, when
choosing among products, consumers often rely on information provided by
competing sellers and on the opinions of trusted endorsers, such as Con-
sumer Reports, the Better Business Bureau, Good Housekeeping, and Morn-
ingstar.
A key feature of the above contexts is competition between
experts (who may be attorneys, witnesses, politicians, or sellers).
Although much research in economics and political science suggests that
competition does not necessarily produce beneficial outcomes (Crawford
& Sobel, 1982; Austen-Smith, 1990a, 1990b, 1993; Lupia & McCubbins,
1998), there is a long-standing debate in legal scholarship over the use of
expert testimony in courtroom settings. Specifically, some scholars fear
that our adversarial legal system does not necessarily reveal truthful infor-
mation and allow jurors to make informed decisions (Pound, 1906; Frank,
1945; Tullock, 1975, 1980; Bundy & Elhauge, 1991; Kaplow & Shavell,
1989). On the other hand, several scholars suggest that competition
between experts in a courtroom will lead to the revelation of truthful infor-
mation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Lipman & Seppi, 1995; Froeb & Koba-
yashi, 1996).
Given the disagreement among scholars about the effects of competi-
tion, we use laboratory experiments to assess whether and when competition
induces experts to make truthful statements and enablesjurors to learn from
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these statements and improve their decisions.' Contrary to expectations
from cheap-talk games (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998)
and contrary to critics of our adversarial legal system, our experiments
demonstrate that competition between experts does in fact help subjects to
improve their decisions. This result is surprising because, in our experi-
ments, subjects receive statements from two competing experts, but they do
not know which expert has an incentive to tell them the truth and which
expert does not. Thus, as in cheap-talk models, subjects cannot readily
distinguish true statements from lies. In such situations, subjects should
ignore the experts' statements and make their decisions on their own (see,
e.g., Lupia & McCubbins, 1998), but this is not what we observe.
Specifically, we find that competition by itself (even when it is cheap
talk) induces enough truth telling from the experts to allow subjects to make
better decisions than subjects in a control group who make decisions without
the benefit of experts' statements. Importantly, our results show that the
positive effect of competition is driven by those instances in which both
competing experts make truthful statements to subjects. Rather than viewing
the experts' statements as cheap talk and ignoring them (as expected),
subjects appear to rely on a simple (and effective) rule of thumb. Namely,
assume that when both experts make the same statements, they must be
telling the truth. This rule of thumb turns out to be quite helpful, as it
enables subjects to improve their decisions even when they are exposed to
competing experts that do not both have an incentive to be truthful.
When we impose additional institutions (such as a penalty for lying or
a threat of verification) on the competing experts, we find that these addi-
tional institutions frequently increase the experts' propensity to make truth-
ful statements and enable subjects to achieve even larger improvements in
their decisions. Interestingly (and somewhat surprisingly), we find that, for
the range of penalties we examine, smaller penalties for lying can be just as
effective as large ones at increasing the experts' propensity to tell the truth
and helping subjects to improve their decisions. Further, our results show
that adding a small penalty for lying to the threat of verification dramatically
increases the extent to which verification induces the experts to make truth-
ful statements and helps subjects to improve their decisions.
1We refer to the people receiving the competing experts' statements asjurors throughout this
article. That said, the lessons about the effects of competition also apply to voters and consumers
who receive the statements of competing experts in political and economic contexts.
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When the competing experts have an opportunity to exchange reasons
with one another, subjects are also able to improve their decisions. This
improvement occurs despite the absence of additional institutions in this
treatment condition and the fact that the exchange of reasons does not
increase the experts' propensity to tell the truth. Indeed, although subjects
in this experimental condition always receive conflicting statements from the
experts, the exchange of reasons helps them improve their decisions, over
and above the improvements subjects achieve when the competing experts
do not exchange reasons with one another. This result is quite interesting,
given that the competing experts' exchange of reasons is still cheap talk and
should not (and indeed does not) increase the experts' propensity to tell the
truth. Thus, it appears that the improvements in subjects' decisions are
driven by the experts' reasons alone, and not by an increase in truth telling.
This article proceeds as follows. We begin by describing our experi-
mental design, which exposes subjects to the statements of two competing
experts before they must make their decisions. Then, we make predictions
regarding whether and under what conditions (1) the experts will be more
likely to make truthful statements and (2) subjects receiving the experts'
statements will improve their decisions. Next, we present our experimental
results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications that our results
have for debates about the effects of competition in legal, political, and
economic contexts. Specifically, we emphasize that because competition in
our adversarial legal system (and in many political and economic settings)
incorporates penalties for lying, verification, and the exchange of reasons,
our results suggest that testimony from competing experts can in fact lead to
large improvements in decision making.
I. THE DEBATE: DOES COMPETITION BETWEEN
EXPERTS HELP JURORS LEARN?
For decades, scholars have extolled the virtues of competition, arguing that
we should incorporate more competitive practices into our legal, political,
and economic systems. This idea that competition will produce beneficial
outcomes is supported by a long line of theoretical and empirical research
suggesting that competition between actors leads to the exposure or verifi-
cation of false statements and, therefore, reveals truthful information and
improves decision making (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Lipman & Seppi,
1995; Froeb & Kobayashi, 1996; Freedman, 1975; Kim, 2001; Walpin, 2003).
Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making
For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) demonstrate that an unsophisti-
cated decisionmaker will make a fully informed decision as long as the
interests of the competing litigants are sufficiently opposed.
On the other hand, many scholars caution that competition is benefi-
cial only under certain conditions and that it may even have negative effects
(Pound, 1906; Frank, 1945; Tullock, 1975, 1980; Frankel, 1980; Langbein,
1985; Bundy & Elhauge, 1991; Kaplow & Shavell, 1989; Shin, 1998; Posner,
1999; Daughety & Reinganum, 2000; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Weigend,
2003; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Further,
research in cognitive science, political science, and economics questions the
assumption (implicit in many arguments in favor of competition) thatjurors
listen to competing experts, as well as trust and learn from the information
that they offer. Indeed, the cognitive science literature emphasizes that
listening and learning are costly behaviors, at least insofar as people must
forego the opportunity to do other things while they listen and learn (Jack-
endoff, 1980; for a survey, see Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Lupia, 2002;
McCubbins & Rodriguez, 2006). Further, because humans have limited time
and energy, they are able to pay attention to and remember only a small
fraction of the information available to them (Schacter, 2001; Lupia, 2004;
Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). And, as the political science and economics
literatures demonstrate, "talk is cheap"; that is, without some cost associated
with making false statements, there is no way to ensure that competing
experts tell the truth (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Austen-Smith, 1990a, 1990b,
1993; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998).
It is this research on the effects of competition that we build on in this
study. Specifically, we draw on the insights of Lupia and McCubbins (1998)
and the experimental design of Boudreau (2006) to analyze the conditions
under which competition between two experts consistently induces both
experts to make truthful statements and enables jurors to trust those state-
ments and, thereby, improve their decisions. Although there are many theo-
retical, experimental, and empirical studies of competition, our experimental
'McCubbins and Rodriguez (2006) conduct experiments in which subjects can receive infor-
mation from others, either for free or after paying a cost. Their results demonstrate that when
listening is free, 97 percent of subjects choose to receive information from others. When there
is a small cost to receive information, the percentage of subjects that choose to receive infor-
mation drops to 50 percent. When a larger cost is imposed, only 4 percent of subjects choose to
receive information. Taken together, these results demonstrate that people are less willing to
listen to information from others when there is a cost associated with doing so.
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design makes a number of new contributions to the literature and has several
important advantages.
The first advantage of our design stems from the nature of the choices
that subjects make in our experiments. Specifically, instead of asking subjects
to make decisions about fictional court cases or to vote for fictional candi-
dates (as psychologists, legal scholars, and political scientists often do when
running experiments), we ask subjects to make choices about math problems
after they hear two expert subjects make statements about whether answer
"a" or answer "b" is the correct answer. (Note that the two subjects who are
chosen to be the experts are shown the correct answer to a particular math
problem before they make their statements; thus, they are made expert by
the experimenter. This is common knowledge to all participants in the
experiment.) One reason that this type of decision is advantageous is that
solving math problems provides a straightforward way to identify correct
decisions and to assess whether and when the experts' statements induce an
improvement in decision making. Stated differently, although it is often
difficult to identify when jurors have chosen the "correct" legal decision or
candidate,' it is very easy to tell when they have chosen the correct answer to
a math problem. Similarly, because we know the correct answer to each math
problem and show that answer to the competing experts, we can easily
identify whether and when the experts tell the truth.
The second advantage of our design is that math problems, even
though they do not look like legal or political decisions on the surface,
capture many key characteristics of the information that jurors receive and
the decisions that jurors make in real-world competitive contexts. Thus, they
can tell us a great deal about howjurors in the real world make choices. For
example, in real-world competitive contexts,jurors are not blank slates when
they listen to the statements of experts. That is, they often have preexisting
knowledge or beliefs about the topics that the experts discuss. Similarly,
subjects in our experiments are not blank slates when they hear the experts'
statements about whether answer "a" or answer "b" is the correct choice
because they have preexisting knowledge about how to solve math problems.
3See Seidman Diamond (2003) for a discussion of the difficulties associated with identifying
whether and when jurors make "correct" decisions. Indeed, she states: "To assess how the jury
operates as a decision-maker, we cannot compare the jury's verdict with some gold standard of
truth because no such dependable standard exists... [I] n the end we cannot be certain that the
correct conclusions have been drawn" (2003:150-51).
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That said, jurors in the real world might be uncertain about their
decisions; that is, they may not know which choice (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty)
is the correct one. Similarly, subjects in our experiments may be uncertain
about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice. As in the real world, the
uncertainty that subjects experience depends, in part, on their levels of
sophistication. Indeed,just as unsophisticatedjurors in the real world may be
more uncertain about which choice is correct, so, too, may unsophisticated
subjects in our experiments be more uncertain about whether "a" or "b" is
the correct choice. And,just as jurors in the real world vary in their levels of
sophistication, so, too, do our subjects, as their SAT math scores range from
450 (the 27th percentile) to 800 (a perfect score).
Further, in real-world competitive contexts, there is something at stake
for jurors when they make their decisions, but the stakes may not be very
large. This is especially true in low-profile, run-of-the-mill court cases. Simi-
larly, there is something at stake for subjects in our experiments because they
earn money if they make a correct choice and lose money if they make an
incorrect choice. As is the case in many real-world settings, the stakes in our
experiments are not very large, as subjects either earn or lose 50 cents for
each decision they make.
Further, jurors in real-world competitive contexts often receive factual
information, and they must then make decisions that are objectively correct
or incorrect. For example, in courtroom settings, jurors listen to factual
information that competing witnesses provide and then make a decision
about whether the accused is guilty or innocent or whether a party to a civil
suit is liable or not. Interestingly, in both criminal and civil trials, jurors are
often exposed to mathematical information that is not unlike the informa-
tion that subjects in our experiments receive (Lilly, 2001; Fisher, 2000-
2001).' Like jurors in the real world, subjects in our experiments receive
factual, mathematical information and then make decisions that are either
correct or incorrect. Given the many similarities between real-world legal
and political decisions and decisions about math problems, there is a close
mapping between the psychological processes that occur in our experiments
and the psychological processes used by jurors in real-world competitive
4Indeed, Lilly (2001:71) states: "[W]ith increasing frequency, contemporary juries are faced
with sophisticated, highly technical evidence drawn from such diverse fields as economics,
mathematics, statistics, psychiatry, engineering, epidemiology, toxicology, serology, and
genetics."
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contexts (stated differently, our experiments have a great deal of psychologi-
cal realism; see Aronson et al., 1998).
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To shed light on debates about the effects of competition, we conduct
laboratory experiments. To this end, we randomly assign subjects to
either a control group or to one of several different treatment groups. We
then ask subjects in all groups to answer binary-choice math problems
that are drawn from an SAT math test and consist of several different
types of problems and various levels of difficulty. We tell subjects in both
our treatment and control groups that they have 60 seconds to answer
each math problem and that they will earn 50 cents for each problem
they answer correctly, lose 50 cents for each problem they answer incor-
rectly, and neither earn nor lose 50 cents if they leave a problem blank.
The main difference between the treatment and control groups has to
do with the conditions under which subjects answer the math problems. In
the control group, subjects answer the math problems on their own, one at
a time. The purpose of the control group is to establish a baseline for how
well subjects perform on the math problems when they must make their
choices on their own (i.e., without an opportunity to learn from two com-
peting experts' statements).
In our various treatment groups, subjects answer subsets of the math
problems that subjects in the control group answer;5 however, subjects in
the treatment groups receive the statements of two competing experts
before they make their decisions. Specifically, before each math problem,
the experimenter selects two subjects at random to act as the experts for
that particular math problem. The experts are then shown the correct
answer to a particular math problem (i.e., the experts are given knowledge
about the correct choice), and they then choose what statement they
5Subjects in the control group answer 24 math problems. Because it takes a great deal of time
to explain particular treatment conditions to subjects and select two subjects to act as the
experts for each math problem, we were unable to have subjects answer 24 math problems in
each treatment condition. Thus, subjects in each treatment condition answer subsets of the
math problems that subjects in the control group answer. We control for the difficulty of the
math problems in our statistical analyses to ensure that our results are not driven by differ-
ences in the difficulty of the math problems used in each treatment condition and in the
control group.
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would like to make to subjects (statements take the form of answer "a" or
answer "b"). Once the experts choose their statements, the "testimony" of
the two experts is passed on to the remaining subjects (either on a single
sheet of paper or read aloud).6 In either case, subjects receive a joint state-
ment from the experts (e.g., "a, a"; "b, b"; "a, b"). Then, subjects must
decide within 60 seconds whether to answer the problem, and if they
choose to answer, whether to pick "a" or "b."
Once subjects make their decisions, we move on to the next math
problem. At this point, we randomly select two new subjects to act as the
experts.7 We select two new subjects for each math problem to ensure that
the competing experts do not develop reputations from one problem to the
next.' Indeed, avoiding repeat-play effects is important because such effects
could confound the treatments we impose. Further, because jurors' interac-
tions with competing experts typically do not repeat over time (e.g., they are
typically limited to the course of a trial), it makes sense to have subjects make
"one-shot" decisions in our experiments.'
That said, the key to our experimental design is threefold. First, one of
the experts knows that he or she shares common interests with subjects (i.e.,
he or she benefits when the remaining subjects answer the math problem
correctly), and the other expert knows that he or she has conflicting interests
6Note that the experimenter reads both experts' statements aloud to the subjects in order to
prevent subjects from learning anything about the experts from the sound of their voices. Also,
all subjects (including the experts) sit behind partitions so that their identities are anonymous.
Note also that we do not actually refer to the experts as "experts" in the experiments. We simply
refer to them as the reporters.
7In some experiments, we randomly select two new subjects to act as the experts by pulling
two subject numbers out of a hat before each math problem. In other experiments, we ran-
domly select four or more subjects at the beginning of the experiment to act as a panel from
which we draw two competing experts on any particular math problem. Then, before distrib-
uting each math problem, we draw two numbers out of a hat to determine which two subjects
on the panel will act as the experts on that problem. We repeat this procedure for each math
problem.
"The total number of math problems that any one subject (acting as an expert) makes state-
ments about depends on which procedure is used to select the experts, as well as the number of
math problems used in a particular experiment. Across all experiments, the total number of
math problems that an expert makes statements about ranges from 14 problems to 1 problem.
Also, subjects answer between 5 and 24 math problems in each experiment. We control for this
in our statistical analyses, and it does not affect our results.
'For an example of a repeated communication game, see Sobel (1985).
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with subjects (i.e., he or she benefits when the remaining subjects answer the
math problem incorrectly). We refer to these as the common-interest and
conflicting-interest experts, respectively. Second, it is common knowledge to
all subjects that one expert shares common interests with them and that one
expert has conflicting interests with them, but they are not told which expert
shares common interests with them on any particular problem. Stated dif-
ferently, subjects know that the experts are adversaries, but they do not know
which expert's interests are aligned with their own."° Third, both experts and the
subjects know that the experts can lie about the correct answer to the math
problem or they can tell the truth; it is entirely up to them. The experts'
ability to make whatever statement they wish is constant throughout this
experiment and is designed to be an analogy to Crawford and Sobel's (1982)
and Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) models, as well as to many real-world
competitive settings.
So how do we induce competition between the two experts within the
context of our experiments? In short, we induce competition by manipulat-
ing the ways that the experts and the subjects earn money. Specifically, the
common-interest expert is paid 50 cents for each subject who answers a
particular math problem correctly. The conflicting-interest expert is paid 50
cents for each subject who answers a particular math problem incorrectly. So,
for example, if 11 subjects (the typical number used in our experiments)
answer the math problem correctly, they earn 50 cents each, the common-
"'We design our experiments in this way because we are interested in analyzing the conditions
under which jurors can learn from competing experts who they do not know. This aspect of our
experiments corresponds to many legal and political settings. Indeed, when learning from
competing experts in a courtroom, jurors may not know which expert's interests are aligned
with their own. Similarly, in primary elections, voters may not know which candidate (of the
many candidates who share their party label) is more likely to have interests that are aligned with
their own. That said, we could design our experiments differently. Indeed, if we were interested
in analyzing the conditions under which jurors can learn from competing experts who they know
something about, we could tell subjects that there is a 70 percent chance that the second expert
has conflicting interests with them. Because the two experts in our experiments are adversaries,
this means that subjects would also know that there is a 70 percent chance that the first expert
has common interests with them. Knowing this, subjects should ignore the second expert's
statement, pay attention to the first expert's statement, and base their choices on it. However,
because this design simply turns our experiments into a test of how perceived common interests
between an expert and ajuror affect trust, persuasion, and learning, and because the effects of
common interests are well understood (see Lupia & McCubbins, 1998 for a game theoretic
model and experiments demonstrating the effects of common interests, which work as
expected), we focus instead on situations in which subjects do not know which expert is more
likely to share common interests with them on any particular problem.
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interest expert earns $5.50 (i.e., 50 cents for each of the 11 subjects who
answer the problem correctly), and the conflicting-interest expert loses
$5.50 (i.e., 50 cents for each of the 11 subjects who answer the problem
correctly). Similarly, if 11 subjects answer the math problem incorrectly,
then the common-interest expert loses $5.50, and the conflicting-interest
expert earns $5.50. In this way, the interests of the two competing experts are
strictly adversarial, or zero sum.
In addition to the competition treatment condition described above,
we impose several other treatments in our experiments. In these additional
treatment conditions, we alter the basic competition condition in one of two
ways: (1) following Lupia and McCubbins (1998), we vary the institutional
context in which the competing experts make their statements or (2) we
allow the competing experts to exchange reasons for why "a" or "b" may be
the correct choice for subjects. Each of these experimental variations is
common knowledge at the outset of each treatment. The details of how we
implement these additional treatment conditions are described below.
A. Additional Institutional Conditions
In other treatment conditions, we alter the basic competition condition by
imposing one of two additional institutions on the competing experts:
namely, a penalty for lying or a threat of verification. Both of these additional
institutional conditions have analogues in real-world competitive contexts.
Specifically, in legal contexts, jurors know that witnesses for both the pros-
ecution and the defense face penalties for perjury if they lie on the stand.
Similarly, an expert witness may incur a penalty for lying (in the form of a
loss of reputation) if he or she is caught lying while testifying during a trial.
Similarly, attorneys' cross-examinations are a form of verification that may
reveal when witnesses have made false statements.
To impose a penalty for lying in our experiments, we simply manipu-
late the way that the experts earn money. Specifically, we maintain the
competition between the two experts, but we subtract money from the
experts' experimental earnings each time they make a false statement. So, in
the penalty for lying treatment conditions, the experts are engaged in com-
petition as before, but we announce to the experts and the subjects that both
experts will incur a penalty (either a large $15 penalty or a smaller $5 or $1
penalty, depending on the experimental condition) if they lie about the
correct answer to the math problem. We vary the size of the penalty because
penalties for lying in real-world courtroom settings also vary in how large
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they are, relative to what is at stake for the experts. For example, the $15
penalty for lying is a very large penalty, relative to what is at stake for the
experts in our experiments. The $1 penalty, however, is small relative to the
money the experts can gain in our experiments. Indeed, the conflicting-
interest expert can gain as much as $5.50 if 11 subjects choose the wrong
answer to a problem and lose only $1 for lying about the correct answer.
Similarly, the penalties for lying that experts in real-world courtroom
settings face can be large or small, depending on the nature of the trial,
the stakes involved, and the value that the expert places on his or her
reputation.
For the other institution-namely, verification-we again maintain
competition between the two experts, but this time we verify both experts'
statements with some probability to make sure that they are true state-
ments before they are provided to subjects. In the high (i.e., 100 percent)
chance of verification condition, if either expert chooses to make a false
statement about the correct answer to the math problem, we do not
provide the false statement(s) to subjects, but rather replace it (them) with
the correct answer when we provide the experts' statements. If either
expert makes a true statement, then we simply provide that expert's state-
ment to subjects.
However, because a 100 percent chance of verification is unlikely to
occur in real-world courtroom settings, we also examine the effects of a
smaller, 50 percent chance of verification. In the 50 percent chance of
verification condition, we roll a six-sided die before the experts' statements
are provided to subjects. If the die lands on 1 through 3, then we silently
verify both experts' statements and replace any false statements with truthful
statements when we provide the experts' statements to subjects. If the die
lands on 4 through 6, however, then we simply provide the answers that the
experts choose to report, regardless of whether they are correct or incorrect.
In this way, subjects know that there is a 50 percent chance that the experts
will be verified, but they do not know whether a particular expert has been
verified on any particular problem.
To make our verification and penalty for lying conditions even more
realistic, we add a conditional penalty for lying to the threat of verification.
We do this because, in the real world, experts must often pay a cost if they are
verified and caught lying. Further, experts' false statements are not likely to
be detected or punished with certainty in real-world courtroom settings.
Thus, in these experimental conditions, the competing experts must pay a
cost (of either $1 or $2, depending on the experimental condition) if they
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make a false statement and are verified by the experimenter. In this way, the
penalty is conditional (and is different from the penalty for lying treatment
conditions described above) because it is only imposed if verification occurs. For
example, in the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condi-
tion, both experts lose $1 of their experimental earnings if the die lands on
1 through 3 (i.e., verification occurs) and if they had chosen to make a false
statement. However, if the die lands on 4 through 6 (i.e., verification does
not occur) and if both experts had chosen to make false statements, then we
do not subtract $1 from the experts' experimental earnings, and we provide
the experts' false statements to subjects. The other experimental conditions
in which we impose a chance of verification plus a conditional penalty
proceed in a similar manner.
B. Reason-Giving Conditions
In our reason-giving treatment conditions, we alter the basic competition
condition by allowing the competing experts to exchange reasons for why "a"
or "b" may be the correct choice. These experiments are identical to the
basic competition treatment condition (i.e., competition without additional
institutions) with four exceptions. First, the competing experts are no longer
required to make statements about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice;
that is, both experts can choose to remain silent. Second, if either expert
chooses to make a statement, he or she must not only state whether "a" or "b"
is the correct choice, but must also give a reason for why the answer he or she
chooses to report may be correct. Third, the experts have an opportunity to
respond to one another's statements and reasons; that is, the experts have
three opportunities to give reasons and counterreasons. Fourth, in some of
our reason-giving treatments, the competing experts must pay a small cost
($1) each time they wish to give a reason and recommend an answer. Thus,
competition between experts in these reason-giving conditions is analogous
to the testimony given to juries, where witnesses may be called to rebut one
another's statements and attorneys may counter the arguments made by
opposing counsel.'
"As Vidmar and Seidman Diamond (2001:1133-34) note: "The adversary system relies on the
opposing side to cross-examine and deconstruct the testimony of the expert to expose its
weakness or irrelevance to the dispute. Then, the first party is allowed to reexamine its experts
to rehabilitate them. When the opposing party begins its evidence presentation, it may call its
own experts in an effort to refute the other party's experts. The end result of the adversary
process is often conflicting testimony from experts-the 'battle of the experts.'"
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Specifically, our reason-giving experiments proceed as follows. After
both experts are shown the correct answer to a math problem, the first expert
chooses whether to make a statement to the other subjects about whether "a"
or "b" is the correct answer (in some treatments, both experts may make a
statement for free, while in other experiments they must pay $1 each time
they wish to make a statement). If the first expert chooses to make a state-
ment, then he or she must decide whether to state "a" or "b." After the first
expert selects which answer to report, then he or she must also select a reason
for why the answer that he or she chose may be correct. When selecting a
reason to support his or her statement of "a" or "b," the first expert may
choose from a brief menu of correct and incorrect reasons that we provide or
write down his or her own reason. As before, the first expert's statement and
reason may truthfully reflect the correct answer or falsely indicate a different
answer. After the first expert selects a statement and reason, we distribute that
statement and reason to the second expert. If the first expert chooses not to
make a statement, then we tell that to the second expert and see whether the
second expert wishes to make a statement and give a reason.
The second expert then chooses whether to make a statement. If the
second expert chooses to make a statement, then he or she must decide
whether to recommend "a" or "b" to subjects. After choosing his or her
statement, the second expert must then provide a reason for the answer
that he or she chose. When selecting a reason to support his or her state-
ment of "a" or "b," the second expert may also choose from the list of
correct and incorrect reasons that we provide or write down his or her own
reason. We then distribute this statement and reason to the first expert. If
the second expert chooses not to make a statement, then we tell that to the
first expert and see whether the first expert would like to make another
statement.
We continue this process until both experts have had three opportu-
nities to provide reasons for their recommended answer. Although both
experts can choose up to three reasons for why their recommendation of "a"
or "b" may be correct, the experts cannot change their statement on a
particular math problem. That said, they can repeat the same reason over
and over, or they can choose a new reason each time. In this way, we allow
the competing experts to go back and forth about whether "a" or "b" is the
correct choice for subjects and about why "a" or "b" may be correct or why
the other expert may be wrong. At the end of the trial, we allow the subjects
to see a transcript of the experts' exchange of statements and reasons. That
is, we have the two experts debate first, and we then distribute the transcript
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of the debate in order to save time and reduce subject boredom. It also
allows us to maintain the anonymity of the experts, as subjects are not
allowed to hear them, see their writing (except after we transcribe it), or
have any other contact or communication with the experts. We then give
subjects 60 seconds to choose an answer to the math problem.
III. HYPOTHESES
For several of the experimental conditions described above, we make pre-
dictions about (1) the competing experts' propensity to make truthful state-
ments and (2) subjects' ability to make better decisions than subjects in the
control group (who do not receive the experts' statements). We measure the
quality of subjects' decisions in two ways. First, we observe the amounts of
money that subjects earn in the treatment and control groups. Indeed,
because all subjects earn money for correct answers, lose money for incorrect
answers, and neither earn nor lose money for blank answers, the relative
amounts of money that subjects earn is a straightforward measure of whether
competition (with or without additional institutions or the exchange of
reasons) helps subjects to improve their decisions. Second, we observe the
accuracy of subjects' decisions in the treatment and control groups. This
measure reflects whether subjects answer a particular problem correctly in
each experimental condition.'"
In the basic competition condition, we predict that the decisions of
subjects exposed to the competing experts will be no different than the
decisions of subjects in the control group. The logic behind this prediction
can be understood by comparing the basic competition condition to cheap-
talk models (e.g., Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998).
Specifically, in Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) formulation, a speaker makes
a statement to a listener, and the speaker's and listener's payoffs are deter-
mined, in part, by what the listener does. In their model (and in our
experiments), the speaker may make a statement to the listener, such as pick
choice "a" or pick choice "b." When the listener does not know whether the
2The main difference between these two measures is how blank answers are coded. Specifically,
the money earned measure is coded as +50 cents for each correct answer, -50 cents for each
incorrect answer, and 0 for each blank answer. The accuracy measure is coded as +1 for each
correct answer and 0 for each incorrect answer and each blank answer. Our results are remark-
ably consistent across these two different measures.
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speaker is trustworthy (and cannot distinguish true statements from lies),
there is no equilibrium in which the listener pays attention to the speaker's
statements. Indeed, the listener should ignore the speaker's statements and
make a decision on his or her own. However, when the listener knows that
the speaker is trustworthy (e.g., when the listener knows that the speaker
shares common interests with him or her) (see Lupia & McCubbins, 1998),
there exists an equilibrium in which the speaker makes a truthful statement
and the listener pays attention to and trusts the speaker's statement.
The game between the experts and subjects in our basic competition
condition is merely an extension of Lupia and McCubbins's (1998)
model, where the speaker's interests are either unknown or known to
conflict with those of the listener. Specifically, in our basic competition
condition, one expert has common interests with subjects, and one expert
has conflicting interests with subjects. Subjects can be seen as receiving a
joint signal from these experts (e.g., they hear "a, a"; "b, b"; "a, b"), but they
are not told which expert is more likely to share common interests with
them, and they are uncertain about whether "a" or "b" is the correct
choice (and they can infer nothing from the order of the statements).
Because subjects are not told which expert is more likely to share common
interests with them, they cannot know which (if any) expert made a truth-
ful statement about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice. Thus, we
expect subjects to ignore the competing experts' statements and make
their decisions on their own (just like subjects in the control group who
must also answer the problem on their own)." In this way, our basic com-
petition condition is identical to standard cheap-talk models, with the only
exception being that the cheap talk in our experiments is composed of a
joint statement-two signals, logically reducible to a single signal. 4
13Lupia and McCubbins (1998) show that subjects ignore a speaker's statements when
they do not know whether it is more likely than not that the speaker shares common
interests with them. Specifically, they state: "[Pleople ignore stimuli that they do not expect to
facilitate reasoned choices... [P]ersuasion requires the [citizen] to believe that the
[expert's] statement will help her avoid costly mistakes. That is, persuasion does not occur if
the [citizen] believes that the [expert] is likely to have conflicting interests. If, however, the
[citizen] believes that common interests are more likely, then persuasion is possible"
(1998:50).
4For readers who are familiar with basic economic principles and with Crawford and Sobel
(1982), our predictions are not particularly surprising. That said, we do not know of anyone who
has assessed experimentally whether the standard cheap-talk result holds tip when there is more
than one speaker.
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For example, if subjects in the basic competition condition receive the
joint signal "a, b," they do not know which statement to trust because they are
not told whether the expert who stated "a" or the expert who stated "b" is
more likely to share common interests with them. 5 If subjects receive the
joint signal "a, a," they still cannot learn from these statements because they
do not know whether both experts made truthful statements or whether
both experts made false statements. 6 Specifically, because the common-
interest expert is strictly better off if subjects make correct decisions and the
conflicting-interest expert is strictly better off if subjects make incorrect
decisions, subjects should not be able to make an inference from receiving
two of the same statements. Indeed, there is no reason for subjects to believe
that the conflicting-interest expert would give up the chance to deceive
them, but there is also no reason for them to believe that the common-
interest expert would give up the chance to tell them the truth.
Because subjects should ignore the experts' statements in the basic
competition condition, we do not have any predictions regarding the
experts' propensity to tell the truth in this condition. The reason we lack
predictions is that, knowing that subjects will ignore their statements, both
the common-interest and conflicting-interest experts can make either true
or false statements, in equilibrium." Indeed, because subjects do not have an
incentive to listen to their statements, the experts are, theoretically, just as
well off if they choose their statements randomly, always tell the truth, or
always lie.
1
5Of course, we expect more sophisticated subjects to be better able to infer the correct answer
from conflicting statements. The reason for this prediction is that sophisticated subjects may be
able to answer the problem correctly on their own and, therefore, self-verify the experts'
statements. We test predictions about the interaction between sophistication, problem difficulty,
and competition in future papers.
"6However, if we were to assume that it is common knowledge that people always choose to tell
the truth when they are indifferent between lying and telling the truth, then the common-
interest expert will always have a dominant strategy to tell the truth. In this situation, as long as
subjects believe that the likelihood of mistakes is low, then upon hearing "a" twice, the subjects
could infer that "a" is the correct answer. If this is true, however, then the conflicting-interest
expert will always lie (as long as speaking and lying are cost free). Thus, subjects, in equilibrium,
will be unable to infer the correct answer from the conflicting pair of statements that they
receive from the experts.
17Although there exist multiple equilibria, we are not surprised that subjects typically converge
on the equilibrium in which the common-interest expert tells the truth and the conflicting-
interest expert lies.
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A. The Big Stick: Hypotheses About Large Penalties and High Probabilities
of Verification
When competition is combined with a large penalty for lying, we expect very
different results. Specifically, when both competing experts are subject to a
large (i.e., $15) penalty for lying, we predict that the experts will be more
likely to make truthful statements, relative to experts in the basic competi-
tion condition. We also expect that subjects who receive the competing
experts' statements will make significantly better decisions than subjects in
the control group.
The logic behind these predictions stems from Lupia and McCubbins's
(1998) model, which demonstrates that when a penalty for lying is suffi-
ciently large, then, in equilibrium, a speaker never has an incentive to lie,
and the subjects trust and learn from the speaker's statements. In the context
of our experiments, a $15 penalty is "sufficiently large"-that is, it is large
enough to ensure that both experts have a dominant strategy to tell the truth
and that all subjects know this.
When competition is combined with a high chance of verification
(say, at the extreme, 100 percent), we expect results that are similar to
those in the large penalty for lying condition. Specifically, when both com-
peting experts are subject to a high chance of verification (i.e., a 100
percent chance of verification plus a $1 or $2 penalty if they are caught
lying), we predict that the experts will be more likely to make truthful
statements, relative to experts in the basic competition condition."5 We
also expect that subjects who receive the competing experts' statements
will make significantly better decisions than subjects in the control
group. These predictions also stem from Lupia and McCubbins's (1998)
model, which demonstrates that increasing the probability of verification
decreases the probability that a speaker can benefit from making a false
statement.
"8We make this prediction about the experts' behavior because the experts are not
only verified with certainty, but they also face a $1 or $2 cost if they are caught lying
about the correct answer to the problem. We include a small cost in this experimental
condition for two reasons. First, in real-world settings, experts must often pay a cost
(be it a loss of reputation or monetary sanctions) if they are verified and found to
be misrepresenting the truth. Second, the original experiments that tested the effects of
verification also included a small cost in the verification condition (Lupia & McCubbins,
1998).
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B. Smaller Sticks: Reduced Penalties and Lower Chances of Verification
As for the smaller penalties for lying and smaller chances of verification
that we impose in our experiments (i.e., a $5 penalty, a $1 penalty,
and a 50 percent chance of verification), we do not have any ex
ante predictions about how they will affect the truthfulness of the experts'
statements or the quality of subjects' decisions. The reason we lack clear
predictions for the experts' and subjects' behavior is simply that, under
each one of these conditions, the conflicting-interest expert does not
necessarily have an incentive to make truthful statements, in equilibrium.
Specifically, the conflicting-interest expert may earn more money if he or
she lies about the correct answer to the math problem. Knowing this,
subjects solving the math problems may or may not trust the experts'
statements.
Indeed, whether the experts (particularly the conflicting-interest
expert) tell the truth in these experimental conditions and whether sub-
jects trust the experts' statements hinges critically on their beliefs about
one another. For example, in the smaller (i.e., $1) penalty for lying con-
dition, if the conflicting-interest expert believes that a particular math
problem is easy (in the sense that most subjects will answer the problem
correctly on their own), then this expert should tell the truth about the
correct answer in order to avoid the $1 penalty, as there would be little or
no profit in lying. Similarly, if subjects believe that the conflicting-interest
expert believes that the math problem is easy, then they should trust the
experts' statements if they cannot answer the problem correctly on their
own. The irony, of course, is that if the problem is easy enough, subjects
do not need expert testimony to answer the problem correctly. On the
other hand, if the experts believe that a particular math problem is diffi-
cult (in the sense that most subjects will not be able to answer the problem
correctly on their own), then the conflicting-interest expert may have an
incentive to lie about the correct answer to the problem. Because the
experts' and subjects' behavior in these experimental conditions depends
on their beliefs about each other and on their beliefs about the difficulty
of the math problems, we must simply observe ex post the truthfulness of
the experts' statements and the quality of subjects' decisions in these con-
ditions. That said, we suspect that as size of the penalty for lying and the
chance of verification increase, both experts will be more likely to tell the
truth and subjects will be more likely to trust the experts' statements and,
therefore, achieve even larger improvements in their decisions.
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C. Exchange of Reasons
Allowing both competing experts to exchange reasons for why their state-
ments may be correct does not alter the basic competition hypotheses that we
state above. That is, even though the competing experts offer reasons for their
statements and have the opportunity to go back and forth, we still predict that
subjects will not improve their decisions, relative to subjects in the control
group. We make this prediction because, theoretically, providing both experts
with opportunities to exchange reasons does not change the cheap-talk
equilibrium that exists in the basic competition condition. 9 This result is true
except in cases where the reason given is sufficiently clear that it allows subjects
to self-verify their answer before they make a decision.
IV. METHODOLOGY
To test our predictions, we conducted laboratory experiments at a large
public university. When recruiting subjects, we posted flyers at various loca-
tions on campus, and we also sent out campus-wide emails to advertise the
experiments. A total of 324 adults who were enrolled in undergraduate
classes and who were of different ages, races, genders, and college majors
participated.
When examining the data gleaned from these experiments, we
conduct four different analyses. First, we assess the effect that each experi-
mental condition has on the experts' propensity to make truthful statements.
To this end, we estimate a random effects logistic regression in which we
regress a dummy variable for whether an expert makes a truthful statement
(coded 1 if an expert makes a truthful statement and 0 otherwise) on (1) a
COMMON-INTEREST EXPERT dummy variable (coded 1 for common-interest
experts and 0 for conflicting-interest experts), (2) a dummy variable for each
experimental condition (i.e., the $15 PENALTY variable is coded 1 for the $15
penalty for lying condition and 0 otherwise), and (3) variables that control
for the order in which subjects solve the problems and the difficulty of the
"As in the basic competition condition, subjects receive ajoint signal from the experts and they
are not told which expert is more likely to share common interests with them. Again, this helps
tIs to capture subjects' fundamental uncertainty about which expert is on their side. Addition-
ally, in the reason-giving conditions, subjects receive the experts' exchange of statements and
reasons in a single transcript that is provided to them after the experts finish going back and
forth. Thus, the experts' statements and reasons are provided as one joint statement.
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problems, as well as characteristics of the subjects.2" The omitted category in
this regression is the competition condition. Thus, positive and significant
coefficients in this model indicate that a particular experimental condition
increases the experts' propensity to tell the truth, relative to experts in the
competition condition. Random effects regressions are used throughout this
article to account for the fact that the experts and subjects make multiple
decisions in our experiments.
Second, we analyze the effect that each experimental condition has on
the quality of subjects' decisions (measured as either the amount of money
subjects earn or the accuracy of their decisions). Specifically, we estimate
random effects models21 in which we regress a variable that reflects either
money earned or accuracy on (1) a dummy variable for each experimental
condition (coded as described above) and (2) variables that control for the
order in which subjects solve the problems and the difficulty of the problems,
as well as characteristics of the subjects. In an important variation of these
models, we also include a TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDI-
TION dummy variable (coded 1 if a subject receives two true statements in the
competition condition and 0 otherwise). The omitted category in these
regressions is the control group. Thus, positive and significant coefficients in
these models indicate that a particular experimental condition increases
either the amount of money that subjects earn or the accuracy of their
decisions, relative to subjects in the control group.
Third, we analyze the effect that receiving two true statements in each
experimental condition has on the quality of subjects' decisions. Specifically,
we estimate random effects models in which we regress a variable that
reflects either money earned or accuracy on (1) a dummy variable for each
additional institutional condition (coded as described above), (2) a TWO
TRUE STATEMENTS dummy variable (coded 1 if a subject receives two true
"Specifically, the ORDER variable captures the number of math problems used in a particular
experiment, as well as the order in which they were presented to subjects. The DIFFICULTY
variable reflects the percentage of control group subjects that answer each problem correctly;
thus, higher values of this variable indicate an easier problem. As for the characteristics of
subjects, we control for whether they have taken a college math class, their year in school, and
their SAT math score, as well as whether their college major is in a math-related discipline. We
control for these subject characteristics because there were small differences in them across our
various treatment groups. To save space, we do not report the results of these control variables
in Tables 1-3, but they are available from the authors upon request.
2 1We estimate random effects GLS regressions when money earned is the dependent variable
and random effects logistic regressions when accuracy is the dependent variable.
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statements and 0 otherwise), (3) interactions between TWO TRUE STATE-
MENTS and the dummy variables for each additional institutional condition,
and (4) variables that control for the order in which subjects solve the
problems and the difficulty of the problems, as well as characteristics of the
subjects. The omitted category in these regressions is the competition con-
dition. Thus, in these models, positive and significant coefficients for the
interaction terms indicate that receiving two true statements in a particular
experimental condition improves subjects' decisions, relative to the compe-
tition condition.22 Note also that the coefficient for the TWO TRUE STATE-
MENTS dummy variable reflects the effect of receiving two true statements in
the competition condition.
Fourth, for each of the random effects models that we estimate, we use
Wald tests to compare the coefficients for each treatment condition. These
analyses allow us to test whether particular treatment conditions are signifi-
cantly different from one another with respect to the extent to which they
increase the experts' propensity to make truthful statements or help subjects
make better decisions. For example, we assess whether the experts are sig-
nificantly more likely to make truthful statements in the large (i.e., $15)
penalty for lying condition, relative to the smaller (i.e., $5 or $1) penalty for
lying conditions. We also assess whether subjects make significantly better
decisions when a smaller 50 percent chance of verification (without a con-
ditional penalty) is imposed on the experts, relative to a 50 percent chance
of verification with either a $1 or $2 conditional penalty.
V. RESULTS
A. The Experts'Propensity to Tell the Truth
As shown in Table 1, many of the additional institutions that we impose
increase the experts' propensity to make truthful statements, relative to
experts in the basic competition condition. As predicted, the experts are
significantly more likely to make truthful statements in the $15 penalty for
lying condition and in the 100 percent chance of verification plus a $1
22Two false statements are quite rare in our data. Thus, we could not systematically analyze the
effect of receiving two false statements. Additionally, because two false statements are so rare,
the results of this regression are the inverse of regressions that include interactions between (1)
a variable that reflects whether subjects receive two conflicting statements and (2) the dummy
variables for each additional institutional condition.
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Table 1: In a Competition Between Two Experts, the Effect of Each Experi-
mental Condition on the Experts' Propensity to Tell the Trutha
Dependent Variable = Whether an Expert
Independent Variables Tells the Truth on a Given Problem
Common-interest expert 2.856*
(0.356)
$15 penalty for lying 3.629*
(1.167)
$5 penalty for lying 3.550*
(1.064)
$1 penalty for lying 2.678*
(0.766)
100% verification 0.993
(0.551)
100% verification + $1 penalty 4.125*
(0.869)
50% verification 0.197
(0.546)
50% verification + $1 penalty 2.607*
(0.978)
50% verification + $2 penalty 1.868*
(0.687)
Free reasoning -0.559
(1.165)
Costly reasoning 
-0.215
(1.222)
Constant 
-5.787
(1.624)
Pseudo R 2  0.340
N 492
'Table 1 displays the coefficients from the logistic regression that we estimated. The competition
condition is the omitted category. We also estimated these results using a random effects logistic
regression, which demonstrates that there is not a significant random effect. The results for the
control variables are not shown in this table, nor are the confidence intervals for each coeffi-
cient. These results and confidence intervals are available from the authors on request or can be
found at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/. Also, the variable for the 100 percent verification plus a
$2 penalty condition was dropped from this model because both experts always tell the truth in
this condition.
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05.
penalty condition (p < 0.05).2 Specifically, Table 4 shows that the $15
penalty for lying increases the chance that the experts make truthful state-
"The variable for the 100 percent chance of verification plus a $2 penalty for lying condition was
dropped from the regression in Table I because all experts make truthful statements in that
condition.
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ments by 44 percent, and the 100 percent chance of verification plus a $1
penalty increases the chance that the experts make truthful statements by 46
percent. Interestingly, the smaller penalty for lying conditions also signifi-
cantly increase the experts' propensity to tell the truth, as do the smaller
chances of verification when they are combined with conditional penalties
for lying (p < 0.05). As shown in Table 4, each of these smaller penalties for
lying and smaller chances of verification increases the chance that the
experts make truthful statements by more than 34 percent. However, when
the threat of verification is not combined with a conditional penalty for lying,
we do not observe any increases in the experts' propensity to tell the truth.
We also do not observe any increases in the experts' propensity to tell the
truth in the reason-giving treatment conditions. Indeed, in the reason-giving
treatment conditions, the common-interest expert always makes truthful
statements, but the conflicting-interest expert always makes false statements.
When comparing the experts' propensity to tell the truth in each of
these experimental conditions, several surprising findings emerge. First,
there is not a significant difference in the experts' propensity to tell the truth
in the $15, $5, and $1 penalty for lying conditions (p > 0.28) .24 Thus, these
smaller penalties for lying are just as effective as the large $15 penalty at
inducing the experts to make truthful statements. Second, there is not a
significant difference between the experts' propensity to tell the truth in the
smaller $5 penalty for lying condition versus the 100 percent chance of
verification plus a $1 penalty condition (p = 0.49). Thus, the smaller $5
penalty for lying is not only as effective as the larger $15 penalty, but it is also
as effective as a 100 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty for lying.
Third, there is not a significant difference between a 50 percent chance
of verification (without a conditional penalty) and a 100 percent chance of
verification (without a conditional penalty) (p = 0.09). Thus, increasing the
chance of verification without adding a conditional penalty does not signifi-
cantly increase the experts' propensity to tell the truth. Fourth, as expected,
when a conditional penalty for lying is added to the threat of verification, the
experts are significantly more likely to tell the truth than when there is not
"
4The p value that we report here is true for each pair-wise comparison between the three
different penalty for lying conditions. More accurately, when the experts' propensity to tell the
truth in the $15 penalty for lying condition is compared to the experts' propensity to tell the
truth in the $5 penalty for lying condition, p is equal to 0.95. When the $15 penalty for lying
condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition, p is equal to 0.43. When the $5
penalty for lying condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition, p is equal to 0.29.
Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making
a conditional penalty (p < 0.01).15 Fifth, there is not a significant difference
in the experts' propensity to tell the truth in the free reasoning versus costly
reasoning conditions (p= 0.82), nor is there a difference in the experts'
propensity to tell the truth when the 50 percent chance of verification is
combined with a $1 versus a $2 conditional penalty (p = 0.34).
B. Improvements in Subjects'Decisions
Our analysis of the quality of subjects' decisions suggests important lessons
about the effects that competition (with and without additional institutions)
has on subjects' ability to improve their decisions. As shown in Table 2
(and as predicted), competition, by itself, tends not to help subjects improve
their decisions, relative to subjects in the control group. However, the addi-
tional institutions, as well as the reason-giving conditions, help subjects
achieve large improvements in their decisions, relative to subjects in the
control group. Specifically, subjects make significantly better decisions in the
large $15 penalty for lying condition and in the 100 percent chance of
verification (with or without a $1 or $2 penalty) conditions (p < 0.05).26
25Specifically, when the experts' propensity to tell the truth in the 50 percent chance of
verification (without a penalty) condition is compared to the experts' propensity to tell
the truth in the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition, p is equal
to 0.009. When the 50 percent chance of verification (without a penalty) condition is com-
pared to the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition, p is also equal to
0.009. When the 100 percent chance of verification (without a penalty) condition is com-
pared to the 100 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition, p is less than
0.001.
251nterestingly, subjects do not answer every math problem correctly in the 100 percent
chance of verification conditions. Although one might be concerned that subjects are con-
fused about the procedures used in our experiments, we are confident that this result
does not stem from subjects' confusion. The reason for this is that, after reading the instruc-
tions for a given treatment condition, the experimenter gives subjects a short quiz that asks
them about their own incentives, the incentives of the experts, and the way that a particular
treatment works. For example, on the quiz for the 100 percent chance of verification condi-
tion, subjects are asked what percentage of the time the experimenter will verify both experts'
statements and announce the correct answer to the math problem (the correct answer to this
question is "100 percent"). To motivate performance on the quiz, the experimenter tells
subjects that they earn 25 cents for each quiz question they answer correctly. After subjects
finish taking the quiz, the experimenter corrects subjects' quizzes in front of them, explains
any wrong answers to them, and pays them the money they earned for their performance on
the quiz. Subjects, by and large, answer all the quiz questions correctly. Indeed, there were
very few instances where the experimenter had to explain to subjects why the answer they
chose was wrong. The experimenter also conducts informal post-experiment conversations
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As shown in Table 4, the $15 penalty for lying increases the chance that
subjects make a correct choice by 56 percent, and each of the 100 percent
chance of verification conditions increases the chance that subjects make a
correct choice by more than 53 percent. Interestingly, the smaller penalties
for lying also help subjects achieve significant improvements in their deci-
sions, as does the smaller 50 percent chance of verification (with or without
a $1 or $2 conditional penalty) (p< 0.05). 2 We also observe significant
improvements in subjects' decisions when the competing experts exchange
with subjects, asking them about their understanding of the experts' incentives, as well as
their own incentives and the way that verification worked. In these conversations, no subjects
expressed confusion about the treatment condition. Thus, we are confident that all subjects
understood the experts' incentives, their own incentives, and the procedures used in each
treatment condition. What the informal post-experiment conversations with subjects
reveal, however, is that subjects who behave anomalously in the 100 percent chance of veri-
fication condition (i.e., either lie as the expert or not trust the experts' statements) are either
bored, make a mistake, or want to see what happens if they do not behave as expected.
Unfortunately, boredom, making a mistake, and wanting to see how the experimenter reacts
to anomalous behavior are factors that play a role in nearly all laboratory experiments.
Indeed, we have replicated our 100 percent chance of verification treatment conditions in
other, slightly different experiments, and we never observe behavior that is perfectly consis-
tent with our predictions. For example, Boudreau (2006) shows that when a 100 percent
chance of verification plus a $2 penalty for lying is imposed on one expert, subjects answer
only 83 percent of the math problems correctly (not the full 100 percent that we would
expect, given that the expert's statement is always verified by the experimenter). Perhaps
more astonishingly, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) pay subjects to predict that the outcome of
an unseen coin toss was heads (regardless of whether that prediction was correct), and they
find that subjects predict heads only 86 percent of the time (which is significantly different
than the expected 100 percent).
17As shown in Table 2, the smaller 50 percent chance of verification (without a conditional
penalty) helps subjects achieve a significant improvement in the accuracy of their decisions
(relative to subjects in the control group; p < 0.05), but not in the amount of money they
earn. Also, subjects in this additional institutional condition are not able to improve their
decisions, relative to subjects in the basic competition condition (p> 0.22). Specifically, when
the 50 percent chance of verification (without a penalty) condition is compared to the basic
competition condition in the money earned models, p is equal to 0.23 when the TWO TRUE
STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is not included in the model and is equal
to 0.66 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is included in
the model. When the 50 percent chance of verification (without a penalty) condition is com-
pared to the basic competition condition in the accuracy models, p is equal to 0.66 when the
TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is not included in the model and
is equal to 0.29 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is
included in the model.
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Table 2: The Effect of Each Experimental Condition on the Amount of
Money Subjects Earn and the Accuracy of Subjects' Decisionsa
Independent Variables
Competition
The effect of receiving two
true statements in the
competition condition
$15 penalty for lying
$5 penalty for lying
$1 penalty for lying
100% verification
100% verification +
$1 penalty
100% verification +
$2 penalty
50% verification
50% verification +
$1 penalty
50% verification +
$2 penalty
Free reasoning
Costly reasoning
Constant
Rho
R 2
Log likelihood
N
Groups
Money Earned Models
(Dependent Variable- =Amount of
Money Subjects Earn on
a Given Problem)
0.056 -0.015
(0.029) (0.032)
-- 0.250*
(0.050)
0.290*
(0.033)
0.249*
(0.032)
0.230*
(0.032)
0.243*
(0.034)
0.300*
(0.029)
0.344*
(0.032)
0.007
(0.037)
0.190*
(0.030)
0.128*
(0.035)
0.129*
(0.039)
0. 151*
(0.038)
-0.348
(0.073)
0.021
0.264
2,450
225
0.287*
(0.032)
0.248*
(0.032)
0.229*
(0.031)
0.240*
(0.034)
0.297*
(0.028)
0.342*
(0.031)
0.003
(0.037)
0.188*
(0.030)
0.127*
(0.035)
0.125*
(0.039)
0.148*
(0.037)
-0.325
(0.071)
0.014
0.271
2,450
225
Accuracy Models
(Dependent Variable = Whether
Subjects Answer a Given
Problem Correctly)
1.106* 0.556
(0.274) (0.291)
-- 2.596*
(0.571)
3.535*
(0.399)
2.577*
(0.353)
2.683*
(0.367)
3.160*
(0.406)
3.981*
(0.407)
5.976*
(1.037)
0.950*
(0.341)
2.183*
(0.313)
1.779*
(0.346)
2.046*
(0.373)
1.965*
(0.355)
-6.033
(0.813)
0.092
-1080.87
2,450
225
3.540*
(0.397)
2.594*
(0.351)
2.712*
(0.366)
3.168*
(0.404)
3.976*
(0.404)
5.959*
(1.035)
0.947*
(0.338)
2.170*
(0.310)
1.805*
(0.344)
2.060*
(0.372)
1.966*
(0.352)
-5.850
(0.804)
0.084
-1067.53
2,450
225
'Table 2 displays the coefficients from the regressions that we estimated. Specifically, the money
earned models were estimated using random effects GLS regressions, and the accuracy models
were estimated using random effects logistic regressions. The control group is the omitted
category in these regressions. Note that the results for the control variables are not shown in this
table, nor are the confidence intervals for each coefficient. These results and confidence
intervals are available from the authors upon request.
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.05.
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reasons with one another (either for free or with a small cost imposed on
them) (p < 0.05) .2
When comparing the improvements in subjects' decisions in each
experimental condition, several interesting findings emerge. First, there
tends not to be a significant difference in the extent to which subjects
improve their decisions in the $15, $5, and $1 penalty for lying conditions
(p> 0.06) .29 Indeed, Table 4 shows that the smaller $5 penalty for lying
increases the chance that subjects make a correct choice by 50 percent, and
the $1 penalty for lying increases the chance that subjects make a correct
choice by 51 percent. Thus, these smaller penalties for lying can be just as
effective as the large $15 penalty at improving subjects' decisions.3 ° Second,
as expected, subjects tend to achieve significantly greater improvements in
2SMcCubbins and Rodriguez (2006) conduct related experiments in which subjects have the
opportunity to receive information from their peers in a deliberative setting. In one variation of
their experiments, subjects have the opportunity to send and receive reasons (either for free or
with a small cost) for why a particular answer may be correct. When the exchange of reasons is
free, there is a significant increase in social welfare and the accuracy of subjects' decisions.
When there is a cost associated with exchanging reasons, however, social welfare and accuracy
significantly decrease. Indeed, subjects in the costly reasoning conditions earn less money and
answer fewer problems correctly than subjects in a control setting who cannot communicate
with one another. These results demonstrate that once there is a cost associated with receiving
information, people tend not to receive it and make worse decisions as a consequence.
2 When the $15 penalty for lying condition is compared to the $5 penalty for lying condition in
the money earned models, p is equal to 0.34 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION
CONDITION variable is not included in the model and is equal to 0.36 when the TWO TRUE
STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is included in the model. When the $15
penalty for lying condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition in the money
earned models, p is equal to 0.14 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION
variable is not included in the model and is equal to 0.15 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN
COMPETITION CONDITION variable is included in the model. When the $5 penalty for lying
condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition in the money earned models, p is
equal to 0.64 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is not
included in the model and is equal to 0.63 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION
CONDITION variable is included in the model. In both accuracy models, when the $15 penalty for
lying condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition, p is equal to 0.07. When the
$5 penalty for lying condition is compared to the $1 penalty for lying condition in the accuracy
models, p is equal to 0.81 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable
is not included in the model and is equal to 0.78 when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPE-
TITION CONDITION variable is included in the model.
The one exception to this statement occurs when we use accuracy as our dependent variable.
In the accuracy models, the large $15 penalty for lying induces a significantly larger improve-
ment than does the smaller $5 penalty for lying (p < 0.05 in both models).
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their decisions when the threat of verification is combined with a conditional
penalty versus when it is not (p < 0.05).3 Third, all the additional institu-
tional conditions (except for the 50 percent chance of verification without a
conditional penalty) help subjects achieve significant improvements in their
decisions, relative to subjects in the basic competition condition (p < 0.01 for
all comparisons between the basic competition condition and the additional
institutional conditions).32 Fourth, there is not a significant difference in the
extent to which subjects improve their decisions in the free reasoning versus
costly reasoning conditions (p > 0.62)." That said, the experts' exchange of
reasons does lead to significant improvements in subjects' decisions, relative
to subjects' decisions in the basic competition condition (p < 0.05 for all
comparisons between the basic competition condition and the free and
costly reasoning conditions)."
1In all the money earned and accuracy models, p is less than 0.05 when the 50 percent chance
of verification (without a penalty) condition is compared to the 50 percent chance of verifica-
tion plus a $1 penalty condition and to the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $2 penalty
for lying condition. In all the money earned and accuracy models, p is less than 0.05 when the
100 percent chance of verification (without a penalty) condition is compared to the 100 percent
chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition. The one exception to the statement we make
in the text occurs when we compare the coefficients for the 100 percent chance of verification
(without a penalty) condition and the 100 percent chance of verification plts a $1 penalty
condition. Specifically, there is not a significant difference between the improvements subjects
achieve in these two conditions (p= 0.13 in the money earned models and p= 0.09 in the
accuracy models).
3
'
2Results for the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition are mixed.
Specifically, when the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is not
included in the money earned and accuracy models, then the coefficient for the 50 percent
chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition is not significantly greater than the coefficient
for the basic competition condition (p= 0.07 in the money earned model and p= 0.06 in the
accuracy model). When the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is
included in the money earned and accuracy models, then the coefficient for the 50 percent
chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition is significantly greater than the coefficient for
the basic competition condition (p < 0.001 for both models).
"In the money earned models, p is equal to 0.63 when the coefficient for the free reasoning
condition is compared to the coefficient for the costly reasoning condition. In the accuracy
models, p is equal to 0.8 when the free reasoning condition is compared to the costly reasoning
condition.
34When the TWO TRUE STATEMENTS IN COMPETITION CONDITION variable is not included in the
money earned model, the p valte for the comparison between the free reasoning condition and
the competition condition is 0.08.
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C. The Same Statement Heuristic: Two of the Same Statements = Two
True Statements
Thus far, our results have been remarkably consistent with our predictions.
However, when we break down our aggregate results to examine the effect
of receiving two true statements in each experimental condition, we find
interesting (and surprising) results. As seen in Tables 2 and 3, it appears
that the effectiveness of basic competition (without additional institutions
or the exchange of reasons) hinges critically on the truthfulness of the
experts' statements. Specifically, our results show that, contrary to cheap-
talk models, when subjects receive two true statements from the experts in
the basic competition condition, they are able to achieve significant
improvements in their decisions (p< 0.05). Indeed, not only do subjects
earn more money when they receive two true statements in the basic com-
petition condition, but, as shown in Table 4, they are also 37 percent more
likely to make a correct choice. Thus, subjects do not appear to ignore the
experts' statements in the competition condition. Rather, they appear to
rely on a simple (and effective) rule of thumb: "Upon receiving two of the
same statements (i.e., either "a, a" or "b, b") in the competition condition,
assume that both experts are telling the truth." Interestingly, this rule of
thumb is quite helpful, as the assumption that two of the same statements
equal two true statements largely turns out to be correct. 5 That is, it is very
rare for both experts to make false statements in the competition condi-
tion (it occurred only twice).
When subjects receive two true statements in the additional institu-
tional conditions, we observe another interesting result: namely, that receiv-
ing two true statements helps subjects improve their decisions consistently
only when the additional institution gives both experts a dominant strategy
to tell the truth. Stated differently, only when the additional institution
makes both experts trustworthy do subjects consistently benefit from receiv-
ing two true statements. For example, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, subjects
achieve significant improvements in their decisions when they receive two
true statements in the $15 penalty for lying condition (p < 0.05). Specifically,
1
5 In future work, we explore potential explanations for why subjects make the out-of-equilibrium
assumption that two of the same statements equal two true statements in the basic competition
condition. We suspect that this assumption stems from subjects' beliefs about others-beliefs
that subjects develop based on their experiences in the real world and that they then bring with
them to the experiment. For a discussion of how subjects bring their own expectations and
beliefs to experimental settings, see Sher and McKenzie (2008).
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Table 3: The Effect that Receiving Two True Statements from the Experts
in Each Experimental Condition Has on the Amount of Money Subjects
Earn and the Accuracy of Subjects' Decisionsa
Money Earned Model Accuracy Model
(Dependent Variable = Amount (Dependent Variable = Whether
of Money Subjects Earn Subjects Answer a Given
Independent Variables on a Given Problem) Problem Correctly)
Two true statements (in 0.251* 2.324*
competition condition) (0.047) (0.551)
$15 penalty for lying -0.182* -1.329
(0.087) (1.109)
$5 penalty for lying 0.012 -0.217
(0.077) (0.689)
$1 penalty for lying 0.092 0.262
(0.054) (0.454)
50% verification -0.252* -0.533
(0.053) (0.441)
50% verification + 0.046 -0.215
$1 penalty (0.079) (0.733)
50% verification + -0.370* -1.201
$2 penalty (0.082) (0.831)
Two true * $15 penalty 0.257* 2.930*
(0.099) (1.360)
Two true * $5 penalty -0.019 0.540
(0.082) (0.879)
Two true * $1 penalty -0.061 0.782
(0.073) (0.906)
Two true * 50% verification 0.261* 0.236
(0.078) (0.929)
Two true * 50% verification -0.131 -0.558
+ $1 penalty (0.082) (0.806)
Two true * 50% verification 0.320* 0.348
+ $2 penalty (0.095) (1.018)
Constant -0.191 -3.884
(0.102) (1.121)
Rho 0.012 0.036
R 2  0.320 -
Log likelihood - -290.73
N 779 779
Groups 151 151
aTable 3 displays the coefficients from the regressions that we estimated. Specifically, the money
earned model was estimated using a random effects GLS regression, and the accuracy model was
estimated using a random effects logistic regression. The competition condition is the omitted
category in these regressions. Note that the results for the control variables are not shown in this
table, nor are the confidence intervals for each coefficient. These results and confidence
intervals are available from the authors upon request.
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05
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Table 4: Changes in the Probability that the Experts Tell the Truth and
that Subjects Answer Correctly in Each Experimental Conditiona
Change in Probability Change in Change in Probability of a
of Experts Telling Probability of a Correct Answer When Receiving
Experimental Condition the Truth Correct Answer Two True Statements
Competition 0.14 0.37
(-0.003, 0.277) (0.240, 0.509)
$15 penalty for lying 0.44 0.56 0.41
(0.180, 0.697) (0.495, 0.630) (0.263, 0.550)
$5 penalty for lying 0.45 0.50 0.13
(0.168, 0.712) (0.419, 0.586) (-0.245, 0.499)
$1 penalty for lying 0.41 0.51 0.18
(0.151, 0.673) (0.429, 0.596) (-0.172, 0.526)
100% verification 0.22 0.54 -
(-0.008, 0.469) (0.469, 0.620)
100% verification + 0.46 0.58
$1 penalty (0.216, 0.718) (0.515, 0.639)
100% verification + - 0.60 -
$2 penalty (0.543, 0.659)
50% verification 0.05 0.23 0.06
(-0.209, 0.291) (0.076, 0.388) (-0.375, 0.490)
50% verification + 0.41 0.46 -0.14
$1 penalty (0.094, 0.694) (0.364, 0.548) (-0.521, 0.244)
50% verification + 0.35 0.40 0.08
$2 penalty (0.097, 0.608) (0.286, 0.521) (-0.377, 0.545)
Free reasoning -0.11 0.44 -
(-0.536, 0.360) (0.328, 0.555)
Costly reasoning -0.05 0.43
(-0.525, 0.426) (0.316, 0.541)
'The results in Table 4 convert the coefficients from the logistic and random effects logistic
regressions reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 to probabilities. These results reflect first differences
with all other variables held constant at their median or mean values (King et al., 2000; Tomz
et al., 2003).
NOTE: Confidence intervals in parentheses; boldface indicates that the 95% confidence interval
does not contain zero, signifying statistical significance.
receiving two true statements in the $15 penalty for lying condition increases
the chance that subjects make a correct choice by 41 percent. However,
when the penalty for lying is smaller (and, thus, does not ensure that both
experts have a dominant strategy to tell the truth), subjects do not benefit
from receiving two true statements in those conditions. Similarly, subjects in
the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition do not
benefit from receiving two true statements. In the other 50 percent chance
of verification conditions (i.e., without a conditional penalty or with a $2
conditional penalty), receiving two true statements helps subjects improve
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the amount of money they earn (p < 0.05), but not the accuracy of their
decisions.36
When comparing the improvements that receiving two true statements
induces in each experimental condition, several counterintuitive findings
emerge. First, receiving two true statements in the competition condition
induces as much of an improvement as receiving two true statements in the
$15 penalty for lying condition (p > 0.71)."7 This result suggests the power of
subjects' apparent assumption that two of the same statements equal two true
statements in the competition condition. Indeed, that assumption enables
them to achieve as large an improvement in their decisions as subjects who
receive two true statements in the $15 penalty for lying condition-a condi-
tion in which (unlike the basic competition condition) it is common knowl-
edge that both experts have a dominant strategy to tell the truth .3
Further, not only do subjects in the smaller penalty for lying conditions
not improve their decisions when they receive two true statements, but the
3 The 100 percent chance of verification conditions are not included in the analysis in Table 3
because subjects always receive two true statements in these conditions. Similarly, the reason-
giving conditions are not included in this analysis because subjects always receive two conflicting
statements in these conditions.
37Specifically, p is equal to 0.96 when we compare these coefficients in the money earned model,
and p is equal to 0.72 when we compare these coefficients in the accuracy model.
3 Receiving two true statements in the competition condition also induces as much (or more)
of an improvement in subjects' decisions as do the reason-giving conditions and nearly all the
additional institutional conditions. As shown in Table 2, the improvements we observe when
subjects receive two true statements in the competition condition are no different from the
improvements we observe in the smaller $5 penalty for lying condition (p > 0.97), the smaller $1
penalty for lying condition (p > 0.71), the 100 percent chance of verification (without a penalty
for lying) condition (p> 0.40), the costly reasoning condition (p> 0.1), and the 50 percent
chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition (p > 0.28). Interestingly, the improvements we
observe when subjects receive two true statements in the competition condition are larger than
the improvements we observe in the 50 percent chance of verification (without a penalty)
condition (p < 0.05), the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $2 penalty condition (p < 0.05
when money earned is the dependent variable), and the free reasoning condition (p= 0.05
when money earned is the dependent variable). Results for the 100 percent chance of verifica-
tion (with a $1 or $2 penalty) conditions also vary depending on whether we use money earned
or accuracy as the dependent variable. When money earned is the dependent variable, there is
no difference between the improvements subjects achieve when they receive two true statements
in the competition condition and their improvements in the 100 percent chance of verification
(with a $1 or $2 penalty) conditions (p> 0.12). When accuracy is the dependent variable, the
100 percent chance of verification (with a $1 or $2 penalty) conditions induce significantly
larger improvements in subjects' decisions than does receiving two true statements in the
competition condition (p< 0.05 for both comparisons).
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effect of receiving two true statements in these conditions is significantly
smaller than the effect of receiving two true statements in the competition
condition-at least when money earned is the measure of the quality of
subjects' decisions (p < 0.05)." This result is particularly surprising because
it suggests that subjects in the smaller penalty for lying conditions may not
have assumed that two of the same statements equal two true statements. If
they had, subjects likely would have achieved significant improvements in
their decisions, as the experts in the smaller penalty for lying conditions
never made two false statements to subjects. Nonetheless, this result may
suggest an important lesson about how subjects perceive institutions and
how additional institutions may cause them to alter their assumptions about
the individuals whose statements they receive.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we discussed laboratory experiments that analyze a core
feature of many legal, political, and economic contexts: competition
between experts. Our results suggest that competition between experts, by
itself, induces enough truth telling to allow subjects to improve their deci-
sions. However, these improvements are driven by those instances in which
both competing experts make truthful statements to subjects. Rather than
viewing the experts' statements as cheap talk (as we expected), subjects
appear to rely on a rule of thumb that helps them improve their decisions
even though the experts do not both have an incentive to be truthful.
Specifically, subjects appear to assume that both experts are telling the truth
when they both make the same statements in the competition condition.
This assumption largely turns out to be correct and, thus, it helps subjects
improve their decisions.
Further, when competition is coupled with additional institutions
(institutions that are common in many legal and political contexts), the
39In the money earned model, p is less than 0.05 when we compare (1) the effect of receiving two
true statements in the competition condition with the effect of receiving two true statements in
the $5 penalty for lying condition and (2) when we compare the effect of receiving two true
statements in the competition condition with the effect of receiving two true statements in the
$1 penalty for lying condition. In the accuracy model, p is equal to 0.17 when we compare the
effect of receiving two true statements in the competition condition with the effect of receiving
two true statements in the $5 penalty for lying condition. Also in the accuracy model, p is equal
to 0.24 when we compare the effect of receiving two true statements in the competition
condition with the effect of receiving two true statements in the $1 penalty for lying condition.
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experts' propensity to tell the truth increases, and subjects achieve even
larger improvements in their decisions. Specifically, when both experts face
a penalty for lying (which they typically face in courtroom settings), both
experts make truthful statements more frequently, and subjects make signifi-
cantly better decisions (relative to both the control group and subjects in the
competition condition). Interestingly, we find that smaller penalties for lying
can be just as effective as large ones at increasing the experts' propensity to
tell the truth and helping subjects improve their decisions. As for the effects
of verification, we find that adding a conditional penalty for lying to the
threat of verification dramatically increases the extent to which verification
induces the experts to make truthful statements and helps subjects improve
their decisions. Indeed, only when a 50 percent chance of verification is
combined with a $1 or $2 conditional penalty are the experts significantly
more likely to make truthful statements and the subjects consistently able to
improve their decisions. Additionally, when we examine the effect that
receiving two true statements in each institutional condition has on subjects'
decisions, we find that only when the additional institution makes both
experts trustworthy do subjects consistently benefit from receiving two true
statements.
In our reason-giving experiments, we find that the back and forth
between competing experts can improve subjects' decisions, even though it
does not increase the experts' propensity to tell the truth. Indeed, in our
reason-giving treatments, both experts always make conflicting statements
about the correct answer to the math problem. Despite these conflicting
statements, the experts' exchange of reasons allows subjects to improve their
decisions, relative to subjects in the competition condition and in the control
group. In this way, it appears that subjects are able to learn from the com-
peting experts' exchange of testimony, as well.
As for the implications that these findings have for debates about
our adversarial legal system, they suggest that, contrary to critics of our
adversarial system, competition between experts, by itself, induces truth
telling and improves decision making. Further, the additional institu-
tions that exist in courtroom settings (as well as the back and forth that
typically occurs between witnesses and lawyers during trials) enhance the
positive effects of competition and bring about even more truth telling and
larger improvements in decision making. These results are particularly
encouraging, as competition between experts in real-world legal settings
does not occur in a vacuum, but takes place within existing institutional
structures and often involves the exchange of reasons. These results also
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suggest that scholars who seek to improve our legal system need not advo-
cate wholesale changes (such as switching to an inquisitorial system);
rather, they should develop ways to bolster our existing institutions so that
they better facilitate truth telling and improve decision making in com-
petitive contexts.
More broadly, our results suggest that scholars should continue to
use experimental and survey-based methods to investigate the effects that
competition has on decision making in legal, political, and economic con-
texts. In this study, we took advantage of the strong internal validity asso-
ciated with laboratory experiments and analyzed the conditions under
which jurors can learn from competing experts who they do not know
under a variety of institutional arrangements. Because we focused on this
one type of competitive context and used one methodological approach,
however, our study leaves open the question of whether and when jurors
can figure out which of two competing experts is more credible than the
other. There is already a large and interesting literature on source cred-
ibility, in general, and the perceived credibility of expert witnesses, in par-
ticular (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hass, 1981; Cooper et al., 1996; Vidmar &
Seidman Diamond, 2001; Druckman, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Chong &
Druckman, 2007). We emphasize that scholars should continue to build on
this literature and explore the role that source credibility plays in competi-
tive contexts.
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